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Questioning Post-Political Perspectives on the Psychological State:  
Behavioural Public Policy in the Netherlands. 
 
 
Introduction – on the psychological state. 
 
Behavioural Public Policy has emerged as an approach to governance which spans 
multiple policy sectors (including public health, personal finance and consumer policy, 
environment and transport, labour markets, education, and urban policy inter alia), 
multiple scales, and has global appeal (see European Commission, 2016; Lunn, 2014; 
OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2015 Whitehead et al, 2014). It is an approach which uses 
emerging psychological insights regarding human behaviour to inform the policy 
making process. Behavioural Public Policy (hereafter BBP) has been described by both 
proponents and critical scholars as a new era of behavioural governance, which has the 
potential to radically transform state-citizen relations, the effectiveness and impact of 
government action, and our basic understandings of human freedom and character 
(Halpern, 2015; Sanders, et al 2018; Sunstein, 2014; Whitehead et al., 2017).  
 
BPP is psychological in two respects. First, it has positioned contemporary social, 
political and economic crises such as the Great Recession, climate change, and public 
health challenges as, at least in part, behavioural problems. Second, BPP builds on 
advances within the cognitive and psychological sciences concerning human 
irrationality (Kahneman et al 1982; Kahneman, 2011; Thaler, 2015). The BBP project 
is thus predicated on humanizing homo-economicus, and emphasizes the crucial role 
that intuition, (social) imitation, heuristics, and emotion play in human behaviour. 
Building on the work of behavioral economics and cognitive design, BPPs utilize the 
‘gentle power’ of nudges and associated psychological tools of behavioural government 
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in order to shape choice while, purportedly, preserving individual freedom (Oliver ed. 
2013; Shafir, 2013; Sunstein, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  
 
The emergence of psychological state apparatuses, which seek to respond to the 
aforementioned crises and epistemological developments, have been subject to 
concerted academic scrutiny and critique. Some have questioned the impact that 
behavioural policies will have on citizens’ autonomy and their ability to shape their 
own behavioural destinies (Furedi, 2011; White, 2013). Others have brought into 
question the limited capacity of the psychological and cognitive sciences to effectively 
explain human behaviour outside of the fairly limited frame of proximate contextual 
influences (Strauss, 2009; Tallis, 2011; Davies and Doyle, 2015). Many have 
interrogated the extent to which new behavioural policies actually seek to address the 
problems generated by neoliberal policy-making, or whether they simply facilitate the 
continued roll-out of neoliberalism by processes of responsibilization and 
desocialization (Berndt, 2015: 569; Carter, 2015; Davies, 2014; Jones et al 2013; 
Leggett, 2014; Whitehead et al 2017). Underlying the majority of these critiques has 
been a concern that BPP is characterized by a rise of state-sponsored behavioural 
manipulation, the diminution of personal freedom, and the broader closing off of 
political debate concerning the role of markets, states and structural inequalities within 
society. This paper asserts that these critiques can each be read through the lens of post-
political theory. 
 
The concept of the post-political was popularized during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
through the work of scholars such as Chantal Mouffe (2005), Slavoj Źižek (1999), 
Jacques Rancière (2004), and Erik Swyngedouw (2007), who argued against emerging 
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forms of political consensus, particularly those formed around expert forms of 
government administration, that tend to close off opportunities for political contestation 
and challenge (see Gill et al, 2012 for a synthesis of these debates). BPP is, ostensibly 
at least, post-political in three ways: 1. it promotes an expert consensus on the nature 
of human action and how best to govern it (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008); 2. through 
psychological techniques that target the unconscious, it pursues approaches to public 
administration which may prove difficult to contest, and which may in the long term, 
be a threat to forms of active citizenship; and 3. by positioning intractable social and 
global problems as primarily issues of personal behaviour, it, potentially, forecloses 
alternative perspectives on the political framing of solutions, the scope of political 
debate, and the contested status of the ‘public good’.     
 
This paper has two main goals. First it links emerging critiques of BPP with the 
concerns of post-political scholarship. Second, and through consideration of the 
emergence of a BPP apparatus in the Netherlands, it questions some of the core 
assumptions of post-political lines of inquiry. Analysis thus provides an alternative 
framework to think critically about BPP, while utilizing empirical insights into 
emerging systems of government in the Netherland to complicate the notion of the post-
political. This paper takes as its point of departure Gill et al’s (2012: 510) call to 
‘establish where the post-political consensus is most and least firmly established’, to 
pay attention to the pragmatics of politics, and to acknowledge that the post-political is 
an unfinished and partial project. But in distinction from Gill et al, we claim that the 
presence of the political in, ostensibly, post-political processes, is not merely about the 
unfinished, or partial, nature of the post-political, but part of an ongoing dialectic 
between the political and post-political. The case of the Netherlands ultimately 
demonstrates the ongoing, if often mundane and overlooked, struggles that surround 
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the development of BBP, and how these very ordinary struggles can lead to the 
emergence of alternative and diverse policy forms.  
 
The research presented in this paper draws on two research projects, which were 
supported by the UK’s Leverhulme Trust and Economic and Social Research Council 
respectively. These projects explored the emergence of behavioural governance over a 
9-year period. In specific terms, the paper reflects on a series of interviews that were 
carried out with policymakers and government advisors in the Netherlands during 
20141. These interviews were carried out at a time when different branches of the Dutch 
state, and the bodies that advise it, were considering the potential applications and 
implications of BPP. The Netherlands was selected as a case study because: 1. it is a 
country where the insights of BPP have been widely incorporated into government 
policy; have influenced the actions of various civil society groups; and have been the 
object of concerted forms of academic scrutiny; 2. it offered a research context within 
which the early uptake of BPP policy ideas, and their political and post-political affects, 
could be studied by the authors. Ultimately, we argue that an empirical focus on those 
                                                        
1 In total, we interviewed 10 representatives from 7 organizations: including, the Ministry of 
the Interior; Ministry of Economic Affairs; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment; the 
Netherlands School of Public Administration; Utrecht University; Tilburg University; and the 
International Institute of Social Sciences. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
involvement in the promotion, analysis, or contestation of BBP in the Netherlands. The 
interviews were semi-structured in nature, which enabled key themes/topics to be raised, but 
also allowed scope for the interviewees to elaborate on novel and/or unanticipated themes. The 
interviews were transcribed in full and analyzed using a mix of inductive and deductive coding. 
The coded interviews were synthesized into a analysis report, which facilitated the 
identification of key themes and indicative quotes. Each interviewee was presented with a full 
transcript of their interview for approval. They were also asked to completed a research consent 
form, which granted permission for sections of their interviews to be reported anonymously in 
written papers and reports. The full transcripts of some of these interviews, and related 
interview schedules and ethical consent forms, are available to download at the UK Data 
Service: http://reshare.ukdataservice.ac.uk/851870/ 
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involved in the shaping of BPP in the Netherlands can help to challenge some of the 
more sweeping abstractions of theories of the post-political (Gill et al., 2012: 517).  
 
 
 
 
The psychological state and the post-political condition. 
 
 
It is important to acknowledge that, as far as we are aware, post-political ideas have not 
been applied directly to the study of the systems of behavioural government we are 
concerned with in this paper. Nonetheless, critiques of BPP have consistently identified 
processes of de-politicisation and de-socialisation at play in the psychological 
explanations of human conduct offered in justifications for BPP (see Leggett, 2014). In 
order to situate this project, this section provides an overview of existing work on the 
post-political and how it connects with critical studies of BPP. 
 
Chantal Mouffe identifies the existence of the post-political condition within the 
popular ontologies of modern ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, ‘good governance’, and 
‘global civil society’ (2005: 2). These ontological presumptions became increasingly 
common during the 1990s, when partisan historical divisions appeared to be giving way 
to global liberal cosmopolitanism. What characterized these widely embraced political 
systems are the notions of rational consensus building, mutual interest, and deliberation. 
According to Mouffe, however, what these democratic systems ultimately tend towards 
was a negation of antagonism and a diminution of the ‘antagonistic dimension [that is] 
constitutive of ‘the political’ (ibid: 2) (see Barnett, 2017 here for a broader discussion 
of the connections politics and presumptions of antagonism). In addition to the effective 
absence of contestation—or dissensus—Swyngedouw argues that the post-political 
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condition is characterized by a generalized failure to make particular political demands 
universal, or to transform particularized problems from local technical issues, into more 
radical universal demands (Swyngedouw, 2007). A further key aspect of the post-
political condition is highlighted by Źižek (1999), when he describes how ‘the conflict 
of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is 
replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats. According to Źižek, the 
practice of consensus is synonymous with the emergence of expert elites and 
bureaucrats, who operate through complex systems of para-state governance and offer 
pragmatic systems of “what works” government that are based upon supposedly neutral 
forms of scientific knowledge. Such pragmatic, solutions-focused governance 
techniques are a key feature of BPP.    
 
According to Rancière (2004), a key dimension of the post-political condition is not the 
exclusion of troublesome political perspectives from consensus politics, but their 
negotiated—and inevitably de-radicalized—inclusion within consensus politics. If 
politics is defined, as Rancière (2004), suggests as the disturbance of the social order 
by those who are external to that order, then consensual accommodation serves to deny 
the space for politics through strategies of inclusion.  Źižek (1999) claims that post-
political strategies of inclusion essentially disavow politics by only allowing forms of 
contestation that do not threaten the socio-political order (for a summary of Rancière 
and Źižek in relation to issues of post-political tactics of inclusion see Gill 2012: 511-
514). Ultimately, the reflections of Rancière and Źižek, suggest that the presence of 
apparent political dispute and contestation does not necessarily signal the breakdown 
of the post-political—indeed it may be supporting it. The critical line of distinction then 
becomes between where the post-political ends and the “properly political” begins (see 
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Temenos, 2017).  
There are many ways in which it is possible to investigate BPP through post-political 
thought2. In this paper, however, we are primarily interested in the compelling parallels 
that exist between critiques of emerging systems of behavioural government and post-
political analysis. The parallels can be seen in at least three key respects. First of all, 
critical analyses of BPP have described the emergence of a rapid scientific consensus 
around the insights of behavioural economics and related psychologically informed 
theories of human decision-making (see for example Berndt, 2015; Jones et al., 2013; 
Leggett 2014). In part, the assertion of an emerging consensus in behavioural 
government is understandable to the extent that it provides a justification for the critical 
scrutiny scholars have developed—and an explanation for the rapid spread of these 
ideas and practices around the world. Accounts of an emerging consensus regarding 
BPP have corresponded with analyses of the advent of new expert behavioural units 
devoted to delivering related policies (see John, 2013). The institutional form of these 
new expert units tends to be characterized by flat, non-hierarchical forms, with 
relatively high degrees of functional separation from government departments. While 
these Skunkworks styles of government support the experimental ethos of psychological 
state forms, they perpetuate concerns over their unaccountability, and their non- or 
para-state form. The purported consensual power of the behavioural sciences, and the 
formation of expert units of behavioural insight policy-making directly mirror, and, to 
                                                        
2 One, very much overlooked, point of connection concerns the scientific doubt that BPP casts 
on the ability of humans to form stable systems of rational consensus over long periods of time. 
Mouffe actually reflects on some of the problematic psychological assumptions of post-political 
practices when she discusses the tension between human reciprocity and hostility and the 
strange hostility which psychology still experiences within political studies (Mouffe, 2005: 3). 
Mouffe’s reflections are, however, framed in the context of Freud’s psychoanalytical work, and 
not modern behavioural economics.  
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some extent, deepen post-political concern about the uncontested, and even 
uncontestable, nature of emerging systems of behavioural government.       
 
The second general parallel between critiques of BPP and post-political thought can be 
seen in the obfuscating political effects of related policies. Through the common 
deployment of the gentle power of nudge techniques, BPP often relies on the targeting 
of the unconscious and the manipulation of choice (White, 2013). From the resetting of 
default options on company pension schemes and organ donor registers, to the 
exploitation of cognitive biases in human decision-making (such as tendencies to 
discount the future relative to the present), BPP quite deliberately seek to change human 
behaviours without recourse to conscious persuasion. Evolving forms of behavioural 
government seek to exploit our own foibles (perhaps an unconscious tendency to prefer 
status quo to change, or an instinct to follow the social herd rather than go our own 
way) in order to achieve broader shifts in social conduct. While the manipulation of our 
cognitive failings may, in the long term, bring us welfare benefits, many have 
questioned the implications of these strategies for political life (Leggett, 2014; Mettler, 
2011; White, 2013).  
 
The third point of connection between post-political concerns and behavioural 
government operates at the level of human subjectivity. In his acerbic critique of 
behavioural economics and related policy developments, Furedi (2011) focuses less on 
the impacts which nudge-style policies have on governments’ relations with their 
citizens, and more on their effects on the political capacities of individuals (it is 
interesting to note that questions of the political capacities of individuals are not a 
central concern of post-political analyses—as they tend to focus much more on the 
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broader societal implications of post-political forms). Furedi argues that BPPs are based 
upon an assumption that people lack the necessary willpower to exercise effective 
forms of moral autonomy (ibid: 134-141). In alignment with post-political critiques, he 
has argued that BBP involves the mobilization of a degree of ‘scientism’ in order to 
refute the moral autonomy of individuals (ibid). On the basis of this transformation, 
Furedi claims that behavioural policies show intolerance for private preferences while 
removing the valuable learning experiences that being wrong can bring to people. From 
a post-political perspective, intolerance for private choice could militate against 
opportunities for political contestation. Although, as Gill et al (2012) point out, the 
relationship between the post-political and questions of tolerance is uncertain. While 
certain forms of overt intolerance could prompt political opposition, in other instances, 
tolerance could itself be seen of a strategy of consensual inclusion and depolitisation. 
 
Perhaps the most direct application of post-political forms of critique to BBP can be 
found in the work of Leggett (Leggett, 2014). In one sense, Leggett’s work counters 
post-political critiques of BBP. Leggett argues that if, as BBP suggests, and government 
is most effectively realized in the minutiae of everyday choice environments, then it 
also invites us to see opportunities for forms of resistance in a multitude of quotidian 
contexts, and not to see politics as only residing in the proper spaces of public 
contestation (ibid). In another sense, however, Leggett’s work suggests an overtly post-
political dissection of the limits of BBP. Thinking about BBP from an explicitly social 
democratic perspective, Leggett points out the ways in which BBP obscures the social 
determinants of behavioural capabilities and opportunities. Crucially, Leggett begins to 
chart what a properly politicalized version of the BBP could be. On Leggett’s terms, 
the politicization of BBP should, rightfully, see the emergence of an interventionist 
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state that is more willing to protect its citizens from the exploitative behavioural 
dynamics of commercial capitalism. Leggett argues that armed with the insights of the 
behavioural sciences, the social democratic state could use traditional forms of 
regulation to counter the pernicious, and individualizing, outcomes of neoliberalism. 
This vision is, of course, very different from the actual use of behavioural insights 
within BBP to achieve policy goals that militate against the worst effects of 
neoliberalism, but ultimately do little to challenge it hegemony. As this paper 
demonstrates, there is evidence of the potential emergence of more radical versions of 
BBP (albeit, not as dramatic as those outlined by Leggett) (see Whitehead et al 2017). 
This paper also reveals that these more insurgent forms of BBP can originate from fairly 
mundane forms of contestation.    
 
There have been a series of critiques of post-political theory that this paper seeks to 
build on and extend (see Gill et al 2012; Lees, 2014; Temenos, 2017). From a critical 
geographical perspective, Gill et al (2012) have suggested that greater attention should 
be given to the uneven development of the post-political condition—essentially 
supporting the notion that from state-to-state, and sector-to-sector the extent of the post-
political may vary greatly. Gill et al have also argued for a more ‘worldly grounded 
view of political deliberation’ (Gill et al 2012: 509), which recognizes the places where 
overlooked forms of politics remain. In a related sense, Temenos (2017) has questioned 
the political absolutism of post-political theorists. According to Temenos, the 
suggestion that many post-political theorists make that only truly radical forms of 
political contestation can be considered properly political denies the power and 
importance of other genuinely politically moments. As Gill et al point out, 
‘[c]ontestation is more ordinary than the radical post-structural continental 
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philosophers might admit’ (2012: 517). Even if more mundane forms of contestation 
are not considered to be properly political, the question remain as to whether the 
political can ever be as utterly disavowed as post-political accounts would suggests 
(Gill et al 2012; Lees, 2013). Building on the work of Gill et al, we reject ‘adherence 
to a purist, ontological vision of politics’, and search overlooked forms of politics 
within BPP (2012: 517). This endeavour not only serves to disrupt and extend post-
political inquiry, but also to challenge many existing critiques of BPP.  
 
 
 
Building the Psychological State in the Netherlands: On Consensus and Expertise.  
 
This section considers recent attempts to build a more psychologically oriented state 
apparatus in the Netherlands. Analysis utilizes this construction process as a basis for 
problematizing the assumptions of consensus formation and the institutionalization of 
expertise that are characteristic of critical accounts of BPP policies and post-political 
analysis more generally.    
 
 
 
The 2009 Government as Choice Architect Symposium and the behavioural 
interregnum. 
 
As with many governments around the world, the Dutch state has been influenced by 
the insights of the behavioural and psychological sciences for many decades (Rose 
1998). It was not, however, until 2008 that policy makers in the Netherlands started 
taking a strategic interest in BPP science. The commencement of this interest was 
signaled in 2008 when the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
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(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid - WRR) proposed a symposium to 
explore the potential utility of the behavioural sciences for policy making. The WRR 
symposium was, in many ways, a response to the engagement with the behavioural 
sciences that was evident within the UK and US governments.3 The WRR symposium 
was convened in 2009 and entitled De overheid als keuzearchitect (The Government as 
Choice Architect). It is possible to see the WRR symposium as a technology of post-
political consensus building in two ways. First, in hearing international testimony from 
academics of different types, it sought to establish and acknowledge the forms of 
scientific consensus that were emerging around BPP research. Second, it sought to lay 
the foundations for political consensus about the potential utility of behavioural insights 
for Dutch government officials (of course this consensus could, technically, have 
involved the acceptance or rejection of such ideas). The impacts of the symposium do, 
however, raise some interesting issues in relation to the practical mechanics of 
consensus building that are rarely addresses in either the literature on BPP or the post-
political.  
 
Although the WRR symposium event appeared to be met with enthusiasm by policy-
makers it did not directly lead to the application of new behavioural insights to public 
policy in the Netherlands. One of the explanations for this apparent inaction was the 
fact that despite hosting the De overheid als keuzearchitect/the Government as Choice 
Architect symposium, the WRR did not produce a formal note of advice to the Dutch 
                                                        
3 In the UK, the Cabinet Office had been exploring the application of new behavioural insights 
in various policy areas since the early 2000s (Jones et al 2013). In the US, President Obama’s 
appointment of Cass Sunstein to head up the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
signaled an intent to apply behavioural economics and nudge techniques within the policy 
making process. It is important in this context to note how the apparent success and prestige of 
policies in other places can support the post-political adoption of those policy in others as 
seemingly sensible acts of good practice replication (see Clarke, 2011; Temenos, 2017). 
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state on the application of new behavioural insights within government. While there are 
various accounts of why the WRR did not formally advise government on adopting the 
insights of the behavioural sciences, one participant in the 2009 symposium suggested 
that there were actually three main reasons for inaction: 1. The fact that economic 
theories (even of the behavioural kind) were not particularly influential in terms of the 
dominant paradigms of the Council; 2. The Council did not generally take the 
emergence of a new set of academic ideas as its basis for offering governmental advice 
(preferring, instead, premises such as ‘what will the Netherland look like in 2030”; and 
3. They were concerned over the potential ethical implications of BBP, and, in 
particular, with issues of manipulation (Interview with former WRR Member May 
2014).   
 
It is interesting to think of the role that interdisciplinary rivalry (and possibly suspicion) 
may have played in curtailing the emergence of an early behavioural insights coalition 
in the Netherlands. What is clear in this instance—and has been widely acknowledged 
in the studies of the sociology of science for some time—is that scientific consensus is 
about more than merely evidence; it also involves the alignment of strategic disciplinary 
needs and influence (Shapin, 1995). It is, perhaps, less surprising (given the wider 
critiques of BPP discussed above) that a consensus did not emerge over the use BPP in 
the Netherlands due to concerns over the potentially manipulative nature of such 
policies. What is more unexpected, is that bureaucratic procedure—based on the notion 
that promoting BPP was not within the constitutional remit of the WRR—should 
inadvertently inhibit the process of consensus formation. Without the formal support of 
the WRR, the Dutch governmental engagement with the behavioural sciences entered 
something of an interregnum. A report was produced by the WRR summarizing the 
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2009 symposium, but this did not constitute a formal advice to government. The WRR 
also gave its imprimatur to De Menselijke Beslisser: over de psychologie van keuze en 
gedrag (The Human Decision-Maker: the psychology of choice and behaviour), which 
was published by Amsterdam University Press). Although these publications did not 
require a formal response from government, it is interesting to note that they stimulated 
informal interest within the ranks of the Dutch Civil Service.   
 
The stalled behavioural consensus of the WRR challenges certain assumptions 
concerning both BPP and the post-political. In the case of the Netherlands it is clear 
that there was not a rapid uptake of BPP as early discussions of their applications met 
academic, bureaucratic, and ethical resistance of sorts. This observation not only tests 
the potential validity of post-political critiques of BPP (which tend to assume the 
formation of fairly instant politico-scientific consensuses around the authority of the 
behavioural sciences—with science essentially overriding politics), but also challenges, 
more broadly, post-political understanding of the relationship between consensus and 
antagonism. It appears that in the case of the 2009 symposium, broad initial consensus 
eventually gave way to antagonism, expressed both in relation to ethical concerns and 
interdisciplinary suspicion. Furthermore, it appears that the WRR’s lack of formal 
action on BPP was the product of the procedural inertia generated by its constitutional 
capacity. The policy interregnum that followed can thus be thought of as much as a 
vacuum of responsibility as it was the product of antagonism and the failure to build a 
coalition of action. So, if a lack of consensus does not necessarily signal overt 
antagonism, and consensus can easily give way to dissensus, it is important not to 
assume that the post-political condition is either militated against by a lack of consensus 
or, necessarily, guaranteed by consensual actions. The story of the early engagement 
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between BPP and Dutch public policy-making would indicate that post-political 
accounts of the nature and work of consensus and antagonism are too binary: failing to 
recognize the complex ways in which both conditions (and the various states that exist 
within and between them) relate to political and post-political conditions. The example 
of WRR’s early interactions with BBP reveals the inescapable co-existence of the 
political and post-political, whereby early forms of relatively uncontested expert 
consensus over the value of BBP gave way to both overt and more subtle forms of 
political and scientific resistance. To an extent, it is even possible to discern a form of 
political resistance to BBP that deployed post-political means (in the form of largely 
unchallenged expert defiance and bureaucratic inertia).  To put things simply then, the 
case of the Netherlands reveals that the arrival of BBPs have not always led to 
consensus formation. The case also demonstrates that we should not be too quick to 
associated consensus with the post-political, and the political with antagonism. 
 
Institutionalizing Behavioural Expertise: Building a Dutch Behavioural Insight Team 
 
Despite placing an apparent brake on the development of BBPs, the interregnum that 
followed the WRR’s 2009 symposium did not last long. While precise dates are difficult 
to locate, it appears that by 2012 Dutch governmental interest in the behavioural 
sciences was growing. 2012 is significant because it saw the establishment of the first 
Behavioural Insights Unit in the Dutch government. This small unit was formed in the 
Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment with initially 2 (full-time equivalent) 
staff. This period also saw the first moves being made to form a more strategic and 
coordinated engagement between the Netherlands’ central government and BPP. There 
appears to have been at least three stimuli behind these developments. First, was the 
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reported success of the UK government’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) (Halpern, 
2015).4 Second, came the 2012 election and the emergence of a Liberal and Labour 
coalition government headed by Mark Rutte. The coalition was founded upon the 
principles of liberalism, but also forged in a time of austerity.  It appears that the low 
cost and libertarian nature of BBP, and the fact that it appealed to groups across the 
political spectrum, meant that it resonated well with the goals of Rutte’s coalition. The 
third stimulus behind these more strategic developments was the contingent emergence 
of an opportune political moment for policy experimentation. By 2014, it was evident 
that most of the major policy agendas associated with the 2012 Coalition agreement 
had either been implemented or abandoned. The government was thus very open to 
explore new policy initiatives and ideas.  (Interview with representative of the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, May 2014). It was in this context that in December 2014 
Rutte’s Cabinet endorsed BBP, arguing that it promised to make government more 
effective and efficient (Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands, 2017: 6).  
 
It is important at this point to note a key distinction between the Dutch case and that of 
the UK. The UK’s Behavioural Insights Team had political support from its inception, 
with British Prime Minister David Cameron being instrumental in its formation and 
even utilizing behavioural economics as a guiding principle in his new vision of caring 
Conservatism and a pragmatic state. In the Netherlands, the promotion of BPP has been 
mainly supported by disparate parts of the civil service, located in various governmental 
ministries, and only gained formal political support later. Indeed, a major driving force 
                                                        
4 Representatives from the Dutch Government visited the UK to see first-hand the work of the 
Behavioural Insights Team, and representatives from the Team have also been to the 
Netherlands to talk about their work to policy makers (representatives from the Dutch 
government have also visited the US to find out about the impacts of the behavioural sciences 
on public policy at a Federal level there). 
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for the coordinated use of new BBPs across public policy in the Netherlands has come 
from the government’s Interdepartmental Strategy Network. The membership of this 
Strategy Network is drawn from the civil service, and it meets regularly to discuss new 
policy ideas and initiatives. Through the initiative of the different ministries, it was 
decided to develop an intergovernmental Behavioural Insights initiative (this would 
eventually become the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands). The first major 
meeting of this interdepartmental initiative was held in May 2013. Senior civil servants, 
representatives from different scientific councils, and a broad cross-section of 
ministerial staff were in attendance.  
 
Before the formation of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands there was 
significant discussion and debate about how best to support interdepartmental 
initiatives relating to BBP in the long-term. The Ministry of Economic Affairs lobbied 
for the formation of a central behavioural insights team that would mirror the structure 
of the UK’s BIT. The formation of a single Dutch behavioural insights unit did, 
however, raise concerns. First of all, it was not clear where such a BIT would be located 
in the Dutch government. The structure of Dutch governmental ministries is non-
hierarchical, with no department having direct control over others.5  Second, some 
claimed that having a single Dutch behavioural insights unit would make it too easy a 
target for those who were suspicious of the application of the behavioural sciences in 
public policy, and the narrow centralization of behavioural expertise it is believed to 
entail. It was in these contexts that that the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands 
was eventually formed. This Network’s structure is based upon individual ministries 
                                                        
5 In the UK the Cabinet Office provided a central hub where the BIT could be located and 
connected to the work of a series of government departments. 
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pursuing BPP (sometimes in the context of formal behavioural insights teams, as in the 
case of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment’s team), with a collaboration 
hub (the Network) allowing for the sharing of good practice (see Behavioural Insights 
Network Netherlands, 2018).  
 
The formation of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands raises the question of 
how we might think about the institutionalization of expertise and control outside of 
more public spheres of political action. In the Netherlands, BPP has emerged out of the 
machinations of civil servants operating in the deep state, and as such signifies a 
managerial cadre of experts which might rightfully be the target of post-political critical 
scholarship. This is in contrast to the situation in the UK, where BPP were explicitly 
supported by several white papers and influential speeches within the Coalition 
government of 2010. While it is clear that the Behavioural Insights Network 
Netherlands, and related ministerial behavioural insights initiatives, have offered 
conduits for new forms of expertise (particularly in the form of the behavioural sciences 
and behavioural economics) to enter government in fairly subtle ways, this has not 
necessarily been a post-political process.  
 
Recent analyses of the emergence of BPP in the Netherlands indicates that there has 
been an ongoing process of contestation and politicisation of behavioural expertise (see 
Feitsma, 2018a; 2018b). The contestation of expertise has in part been a product of the 
inevitable decisions that must be made in relation to which forms of expertise, with 
which particular behavioural insights, should be engaged with. It has also been a result 
of the process of working out which forms of behavioural expertise are actually most 
relevant to the policy-making process itself (2018b). Furthermore, the 
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institutionalization of expertise is not about bringing scientists into government, as it is 
governmental officials actively filtering scientific insights to meet their own needs 
(2018b). It is thus clear that the emergence of BPP in the Netherlands has not so much 
involved the hard-wiring of behavioural science expertise into government, but the 
training and re-purposing of existing civil servants in new policy-making skills 
(Feitsma and Schillemans, 2018). While this process could be associated with the post-
political production of uncontested expertise, our research indicates that it has actually 
involved the institutionalization of the inexpert, or what Parsons has described as a 
process of muddling through at the policy-science interface (2002). BPP is generally 
not a part of the public administration training which many civil servants in the 
Netherland receive. As such, the processes of muddling through have seen policy-
makers in the Netherlands develop a fairly open set of engagements with the 
behavioural sciences (although we acknowledge the dominant impacts of behavioural 
economics). The post-political effects of expertise have thus been militated against by 
the fact that few civil servants have been able to adopt positions of un-contestable 
expertise, and because BPP has, from the outset, been subject to various adaptations 
and “corruptions” to meet the needs of policy-makers. While this process could not be 
described as political, it would be equally inaccurate to suggest it was post-political. 
 
The structure of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands has also facilitated 
opportunities for different ministries to engage and adapt different forms of expertise, 
and for these adaptations to become points of policy contestation and debate within 
interdepartmental collaboration. There is some evidence that different governmental 
ministries in the Netherlands are already challenging accepted behavioural policy 
norms (such as the use of Randomised Controlled Trials) within their practise (ibid). 
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The case of BPP making in the Netherlands thus draws attention to the vagaries of 
expertise within politics. While it is clear that over time expertise can act in post-
political ways, the actual transfer of scientific ideas into public policy is rarely about 
the transmission of clear, and uncontested, spheres of expertise into government.  
 
Behavioural Politics and the Psychological State: On Obfuscation and Autonomy.  
 
Ethics and obfuscation 
 
 
One of the primary, if implicitly, post-political critiques of BPP is that in targeting many 
of the subconscious drivers of human action it tends to operate in a way that obscures 
its modes of operation, becomes difficult to politically resist, and does not support the 
development of capacities to act politically (Jones at al 2011). Yet in the case of the 
Netherlands, the accusation of political obfuscation (and manipulation) has become 
something of an object of political and ethical debate and contestation itself. The 
common ethical criticism of BPP is that it tends to involve the dark arts of 
manipulation, and attempts to change people’s behaviours in ways they may be 
unaware of, and in directions they may not have sanctioned (White, 2013). 6  An 
interview we conducted with an erstwhile member of the WWR revealed an 
unanticipated ethical debate concerning BBP. This debate was not just about the 
manipulative potential of BBP, but sought to raise broader ethical questions about the 
formulation and delivery of more conventional forms of public policy (such as 
regulations, incentives, educational initiatives). According to the representative of the 
WRR, concerns about the ethics of BBPs stimulated wider debates about the often-
                                                        
6 This assertion, in part, rests on the erroneous assumption that all BPPs involve subconscious 
nudges, which they clearly do not (see Oliver ed. 2013). 
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unacknowledged manipulative nature of established policy mechanisms; and the ways 
in which existing policies tended to yield greatest benefit to the wealthy well, and not 
the most disadvantaged in society (Interview with former WRR Member May 2014).  
 
 
In this paper we are not so much interested in the intricacies of this ethical debate, but 
in the very fact that there is one. The debate about the ethics of BPP is evident beyond 
the WRR and has also been present in the work of the Netherlands Centre for Ethics 
and Health (CEG) (see ten Have, 2014) and the Dutch Council for Social Development 
(RMO). In many ways, these discussions indicate that as well as potentially obfuscating 
public policy, BPP provides the grounds for renewed political debate about the nature 
of public policy itself7.  
 
In his recent analysis of the morality of BBPs, Cass Sunstein suggests that ethical issues 
pertain to four core values: welfare, human dignity, autonomy, and self-government. 
When it comes to public policy, and the varied acts of government, Sunstein recognizes 
that the ethical values we prioritize are inevitably contested (2016). The ethical debates 
concerning BPP waged in the Netherlands appear, in part, to centre on the tensions 
between welfare, personal autonomy, and human dignity. On the one hand, 
conventional policy approaches that are based upon education and incentives appear to 
support values of personal autonomy (and the right to ignore a policy and go your own 
way), and human dignity (or the idea that you are capable of making your own decisions 
and should be respected accordingly). On the other hand, BPP advocates suggest that 
                                                        
7 The potential for behavioural insight policies to stimulate political debate and scrutiny is also 
evident in the UK, where related policies prompted a formal House of Lords Inquiry (through 
the Science and Technology Committee) and related report (see House of Lords, 2011) 
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their policies may make it more difficult for people not to follow policy prompts, but 
that this results in a much better set of welfare results (particularly when it turns out 
that people actually aren’t that good at making decisions that support their own long-
term interests). What interests us about this Dutch debate is that ethical considerations 
have been stimulated by BPP, and not closed-off by it. Consequently, while specific 
policies may obfuscate policy decisions in certain everyday situations (by by-passing 
conscious action and decision-making), in other, often more strategic contexts, it 
appears that through a concern with actually existing welfare delivery they can serve to 
open-up and re-politicize the policy formulation process itself.  
 
Critical analyses of post-political theory have suggested that attention should be drawn 
to the uneven development of the post-political condition (see Gill et al, 2012; 
Temenos, 2017). The emergence of ethical debates around BPP in the Netherlands 
suggests that sensitivity to the uneven development of the post-political condition 
should not, however, just be about how the post-political is present in certain places 
while absent in others, but should also recognize how certain practices of government 
have the potential to produce both political and post-political affects at the same time. 
In this context, we argue that it is helpful to consider the dialectical relations that often 
exist between the political and post-political, as the post-politicization of one issue, in 
one context, results in its re-politicization elsewhere. 
 
 
Questions of autonomy. 
 
 
Connected to concerns over the obfuscation of the policy process, BPP has also be 
subject to critiques which suggest it can lead to the diminution of personal autonomy. 
A key moment within discussions about autonomy, self-government, and behavioural 
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policy in the Netherlands came in 2014, with the publication of the Dutch Council for 
Social Development’s (RMO) Resisting Temptation report (RMO, 2014). The RMO 
advises the Dutch government on a range of social issues8.  
 
At its heart, the Resisting Temptation report is keen to establish the different political 
visions that are encoded within BPP. As a representative of the RMO stated to us, 
 
“[…] what I find really funny in the discussion right now is that I think most 
people in the Netherlands who are positive about nudging are positive because 
they see it as an extra way to do things […] [but] it could also be interesting for 
somebody who thinks the government should be more liberal […] it is claimed 
by people who want to do more, but you could use it to do less.  And that’s what 
we tried to do with reframing [in the Resisting Temptation Report]. It shouldn’t 
be pushing people in the right direction [while] harming their autonomy, but it 
should be giving people more space, giving people more freedom without leaving 
them behind […] It’s a different way of looking at it […]” (Interview RMO 
representative, May 2014).  
 
The RMO recognize that the non-regulatory nature of BPP can result in both more 
(welfarist) or less (liberalist) interventionist state systems. The key aim of the RMO 
report appears to be to ensure that BPP preserves personal autonomy, while realizing 
that this autonomy is itself based upon certain capacities to act that depend on welfarist 
forms of intervention (fusing together two of Sunstein’s separate ethical values). While 
                                                        
8 In its recommendations and reports, the Council examines and explains the significance of 
new social developments in terms of policy. Central to the Council's deliberations is the modern 
citizen in the setting of today's society. 
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the tension here between liberty and equity is not new, it is interesting how attempts to 
respond to emerging BPPs leads to new political discussions about this historical 
conundrum.  
 
The RMO ultimately suggest that BBP could support the development of more 
meaningful forms of autonomy, similar to what Sunstein refers to as self-government. 
Self-government is distinct from autonomy to the extent that autonomy implies being 
unaffected by behavioural government. The notion of self-government suggests the 
development of capacities to act which focus more on self-authored decision-making 
techniques, as opposed to externally-construed nudges. The RMO representatives we 
spoke with positioned this idea of autonomy and self-government in relation to concepts 
of positive and negative freedom, 
 
 “So, we formulate an autonomy paradox.  And that relates to this distinction of 
positive and negative freedom where government increasingly is retreating from 
the public domain and expects people to take their own responsibility. That could 
easily be framed as an expansion of people’s negative freedom because there’s 
less and less distortion by government. But the more […] government expects 
people to take up their own responsibility, they expect people to be autonomous 
to make conscious choices. And then comes in positive freedom because […] if 
people don’t have full agency, the awareness, the self-esteem, they can’t make 
those choices” (Interview RMO representatives, May 2014).  
 
In the work of Amartya Sen (1993), negative freedom is interpreted a form of autonomy 
that is predicated on non-interference. Positive freedom, on the other hand, connects 
autonomy to the ability of someone not only to be free of coercion, but also to have the 
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capabilities to pursue their chosen paths in life. BPP is not easily categorized when it 
comes to questions of positive and negative freedom. Nudges can be seen as an 
enhancer of negative freedom (as a form of softer regulation than the law for instance), 
or something which erodes negative forms of freedom (a nudge is still paternalist, no 
matter how soft). BBP can, however, been seen to support positive freedom (making it 
easier for people to make the decisions that are in their own long-term interest) and 
undermine such freedoms (as in many forms it offers little in the way of behavioural 
capacity building). 
 
According to the authors of the RMO report, there is a danger that BPPs could 
support the emergence of fairly facile, neutral citizenship that does little to really 
enhance self-governing capacities. As an RMO representative observed, 
  
So, they [The WWR] said, well, the rest of society is pushing citizens in this 
direction like eating unhealthy food. So, we should push back exactly to the same 
kind of degree of geometry. So that in the end, he or she will end up in the middle 
[…] And that is what we feel very uncomfortable with because who decides that 
it’s just a two-dimensional space? […] ” (Interview RMO representative, May 
2014) 
 
In this context, BPP could be seen to do enough to undermine liberal definitions of 
autonomy, but not enough to actually enhance positive freedom. The RMO report thus 
calls for the deployment of alternative forms of BPP to promote much more active 
citizenship. Although the Resisting Temptation report does not spell out how a more 
behaviourally empowered citizenry could be formed, it is clearly suggestive of the 
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development of systems of behavioural education and learning that would support a 
meta-awareness of individual behaviour and its driving forces. The RMOs thinking is 
different to the more overtly political vision of an interventionist social democratic state 
that protects citizens from the exploitative behavioural dynamics of neoliberalism 
proferred by Leggett (2014) (see above). It is nevertheless indicative of the 
politisization of BBP thinking that has emerged in the Netherlands. 
 
In this section, we have seen how various challenges to the post-political tendencies of 
BPP have been developed in a range of ordinary contexts, which have routinely been 
denied properly political status within post-political theory. The Resisting Temptation 
report is significant because not only does it come from a more ordinary space of 
politics, but because it offers a radical challenge to the conformist welfarist ethics of 
BPP. We acknowledge that the formal, governmental advisory role of the RMO means 
that the inclusion of its ideas within emerging forms of consensus around BPP could 
lead to their inevitable de-radicalization (as post political theorists would predict). 
Notwithstanding this, we assert the very existence of Resisting Temptation report, and 
the debates it has generated, should at least give us pause for thought when applying 
post-political critiques to BPP, and, moreover, lead us to question the political 
assumptions of post-political thinking. 
 
Is there a ‘Dutch nudge’, and is it more empowering and collective? 
 
The previous section demonstrated that the emergence of BPPs in the Netherlands, and 
the varied ethical and constitutional issues they raise, have directly led to political 
debates and moments of contestation about the nature of human autonomy, welfare, 
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self-government, and the practices of obfuscation. The Netherlands has also been 
witness to a broader politicization of BPP, which connects nudging, consensus politics, 
and questions of the public good. These developments have moved discussion about 
the behavioural sciences and public policy from the level of the individual (where much 
of the specialist academic debate has been focused) into a broader social sphere. These 
developments have directly opened-up discussions about the varied ways in which BPP 
may be linked to consensus formation. 
 
One policy advisor we spoke to, for example, raised the important question concerning 
when and why collective forms of political consensus may be needed to support a 
behavioural policy intervention in the Netherlands, 
 
“[C]ould nudging or behavioural types of intervention [be applied to] goals that 
everybody subscribes [to], or where there is a consensus about it […] Or where 
consensus is lacking […] So, what they say is if you use nudge instruments, you 
should first have a discussion about the paternalism behind the libertarian side, if 
you understand what I mean. So, there should be first a discussion about what are 
the motives, the intentions […] Because if it’s implicit, then you depoliticize 
something that is really political” (Interview academic government policy 
advisor, Netherlands, May 2014). 
 
This reflection raises two important points. The first is procedural, and it concerns the 
importance of establishing some form of political consensus on the use of specific 
behavioural policies. On these terms, consensus, by definition, involves open public 
discussion about the motives and goals of behavioural policies so that the often-
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submerged policies associated with nudge can be scrutinized before being applied. 
Consensus on these terms could of course apply both to the goal of policy (perhaps 
increasing organ donation or healthy eating) and the policy mechanism (resetting 
defaults/re-designing choice environments). The second issue raised here concerns 
situations where there may be an absence of consensus. When there is an absence of 
consensus concerning either the goal of a behavioural policy and/or its means of 
delivery it would appear that its application would be much more controversial in the 
Netherlands. As we have already established, post-politics is itself regarded as a 
pernicious product of expert consensuses, which removes decision making from the 
political spheres of contestation. But if achieving politically-contested consensus is 
prioritized precisely because of the obfuscating long-term potential of nudge-style 
policies, then some of the post-political concerns surrounding BPP are lessened. It is 
important to point out here, of course, that consensuses are not inherently post-political: 
in their formation phases consensuses can be the product of overt political antagonism. 
It is only once established, that an enduring and largely unquestioned consensus 
becomes post-political. 
 
The issue of consensual decision-making raises broader questions concerning the 
connections between BPP and the governing of collective action challenges (such as 
climate change). Questions of collection action shift BPP from a focus on individual 
conduct to questions of the public good. As one RMO representative observed, 
 
“A lot of people who are in favour of nudge say, ‘Well, nudge isn’t the problem 
because it only strengthens your autonomy […] But a question I think we dealt 
with a little bit [is] ‘Okay, but what does the [RMO] Council think about using 
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nudges for public problems?’ And public problems are not always just for your 
own autonomy but are to steer people against their own values or issues just 
because we have this collective problem, global warming, and we don’t want 
people to put up the heat because they like it themselves. We want them to put it 
down because otherwise, we have this collective [problem]” (Interview RMO 
representative, Netherlands, May 2014). 
 
It is important to acknowledge that there is no precise line of demarcation, or necessary 
line of contradiction, between individual behaviours and public interest. It is, however, 
clear that individual and collective interests are not always well aligned. The 
application of nudge-type policies to public, as well as individual behavioural, 
problems has actually been discussed in other national contexts. In the UK for example, 
the House Lord’s Inquiry into BBP suggested that individual opposition to behavioural 
policy is not a good reason to avoid applying BPP in the broader public interest (House 
of Lords, 2011). It appears likely that in the Netherlands BPP will be used to address a 
range of public interest issues. It will therefore be intriguing to see what normative 
justifications will be offered by the Netherlands government for using behavioural 
policy to address public problems that appear to run counter to the interests/preferences 
of the individual. 
 
One distinctive idea that is emerging in the Netherlands, which connects discussions 
about BBP, collective politics, and public interest is the notion of collaborative 
nudging. In some ways, the idea of collaborative nudging builds on the insights of the 
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self-nudging movement.9 Collaborative nudging, however, takes this approach a stage 
further, and suggests that the behavioural sciences could be mobilized at a collective 
social level. As one policy advisor observed, 
 
“So, we say that if you have these controversial topics, you should involve 
citizens more and civic organizations more and collaborate with them and use 
little experiments before you roll out the whole programme for the whole country 
and because, first, you have to know what the effects are and if the effects are the 
effects you want […] Experiments with people, not just about people or around 
them […] but with them” (Interview with RMO representative, Netherlands, May 
2014). 
 
The idea of collaborative nudging suggests that people and civic organization could be 
engaged more actively in the experimental design of BBPs (see Jones et al 2013). This 
form of collective engagement could facilitate consensus decision-making not only at 
the level of whether a policy should or not be delivered, but in the very form and 
function of the policy itself. Collaborative nudging could also provide a context for 
communities (at a range of scales) to openly discuss the tensions that may exist between 
individual and public interests. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the idea 
of collaborative nudging suggests a form of behavioural policy that recognizes that 
behaviours are not only constituted at an individual but also a social level. The idea of 
collaborative nudges is significant because it again shows that BPP does not have to 
                                                        
9 The self-nudging movement suggests that one way of addressing the ethical issues raised by 
BPP is by encouraging individuals to use the insights of the behavioural sciences to shape their 
own behaviours. 
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result in the diminution of human agency or increases in political obfuscation, but 
instead can be connected to strategies of citizen empowerment.  
 
We do acknowledge that it is one thing for there to be strategic discussions about more 
empowering, consensually oriented, and collective behavioural policy-making, but that 
it is quite another for this to begin to shape policy. And, in the absence of any 
substantive research on the actual long-term effects of the wide-spread use of BPP and 
related forms of policy experimentation, there are currently limited empirical resources 
on which to base strategies for designing empowering and collective BPP, which can 
substantively accommodate political contestation and avoid narrowing the terms of 
public debate. There is, however, already some evidence that more collaborative forms 
of BPP are emerging at a municipal level in the Netherlands (see Feitsma, 2018 for 
reflections on the Urban Nudging movement in Utrecht). The very presence of these 
alternative forms of nudging suggests that BBP in the Netherlands is not only 
generating forms of political resistance, but also political adaptions. Again, while these 
adaptations of BBP may not reflect the forms of strong, state-orchestrated political 
resistance to behavioural power envisaged by Leggett (2014), they do suggest emerging 
forms of BBP in the Netherland appear to be politisizing behavioural power in both 
their forms and functions.  
 
 
 
Conclusion: Behavioural Insights and the (post)post-political. 
 
 
 
This paper has pursued two main goals. First it has sought to connect together emerging 
critiques of Behavioural Public Policy through the concerns of post-political 
scholarship. Second, through consideration of the emergence of a nascent 
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psychological state apparatus in the Netherlands it has challenged the idea that the post-
political is ever an accomplished and necessarily clear-cut state of affairs. At the 
beginning of the paper it was claimed that BPP could be thought of as post-political in 
three main ways: 1. to the extent that they promote an expert, non-ideological consensus 
on the nature of human action and how best to govern it; 2. because of the psychological 
techniques they deploy to target the unconscious, and which actively prevent acts of 
government being contested; and 3. because of the way in which a focus on individual 
behaviour can potentially suffocate political debate over the very framing of problems 
which are actually social, structural and collective in nature. Ultimately, this paper has 
revealed that the extent to which BPPs can be thought of and critiqued as post-political 
phenomena depends fundamentally on the context within which they are analyzed. 
Consequently, while more generalized critiques of the post-political problems of BPP 
find some traction, more fined-grained empirical analysis of BPP landscapes appears 
to cast doubt on post-political assumptions about the nature of politics, consensus, 
antagonism and expertise. This is evident in our consideration of the institutionalization 
of expertise, which outlined how the Dutch state has been witness to the development 
of a managerial cadre of behavioural insights expertise. Such forms of expertise are 
frequently the subject of post-political critique. Closer inspection of the nature of the 
Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands, and related administrative structures, 
however, complicates post-political critiques. The non-hierarchical structure, and 
diffuse form, of the Behavioural Insights Network Netherlands, appears to lend itself 
to a diverse set of behavioural governmental and scientific interactions and ultimately 
to the contestation of expertise. While this paper openly acknowledges that these forms 
of struggle and contestation within the deep state may not reflect the radical 
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antagonisms promoted by critics of the post-political, they clearly complicate the idea 
that the institutionalization of behavioural expertise necessarily closes-off contestation.  
 
In the case of the establishment of BPP in the Netherlands, we have also seen that the 
formation of a scientific and political consensus is far more contingent than routinely 
portrayed within the writings of advocates of BPP and in post-political critique. In the 
Netherlands, we found that consensus was challenged by politico-ethical divides and 
even unintentionally stalled because of bureaucratic procedure. In noticing that a lack 
of consensus does not necessarily signal antagonism, and that consensus can easily give 
way to dissensus, the analysis presented in this paper supports the position that the post-
political condition is neither militated against by a lack of consensus or, necessarily, 
undermined by consensual actions.   
 
This paper also considered the accusations of political obfuscation and diminished 
political autonomy that are routinely leveled at BPP. Our analysis revealed that while 
behavioural policies may obfuscate policy decisions in certain everyday situations 
(particularly in the form of unconscious nudges), in other, often more strategic contexts, 
it appears that they can serve to open-up and re-politicize the policy formulation process 
itself (particularly in relation to broader debates about the balancing of the ethical 
values of welfare, autonomy, human dignity and self-government). In this sense, there 
appears to be something in the (seemingly) controversial nature of BPP that engenders 
new public and political discussion on the appropriate relationship between the state 
and its citizens. In terms of diminished political autonomy and the potential for the 
alternative development of collective nudges the paper has demonstrated that while 
certain forms of BPP clearly have the potential to damage (thin) forms of autonomy, it 
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is possible to conceive of behavioural policies that support the advancement of positive 
forms of freedom and collective action.  
 
Ultimately, this paper has exposed a complex set of dialectics that connect together the 
political and post-political conditions. These are dialectics that are often only evident 
at an empirical level and when what counts as being properly political takes a less 
radical and more banal form. This does not, of course, mean that BPP should not be 
subject to post-political critique—it may, often, be a justified critical perspective. Nor 
does it mean that the Netherlands is in any way typical of how different political 
constituencies have engaged with BPP. What the case of the development of BPP in 
the Netherlands does indicate is that related policies are not necessarily post-political 
in form, and that it may be helpful to rethink how we conceive of the very notion of the 
post-political condition in practical terms.   
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